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TOWN OF GREECE AND CITY OF SAGUENAY:
NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES WITH OR
WITHOUT AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DONALD L. BESCHLE*
1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the United States Supreme Court first considered
the scope of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,' the
relationship between non-establishment principles and the Free.Ex-
ercise Clause has been a sourceof controversy. Are the clauses capa-
ble of consistent application? Are they inevitably in tension, if not in
conflict? If non-establishment principles and free exercise principles
come into conflict in a particular case, should one always prevail?
And is it always evident in a particular case whether it presents an
establishment or a free exercise issue?2
A survey of constitutional protection of religion in western
democracies shows protection for the freedom of religion and con-
science is widespread, but explicit prohibitions. on government es-
tablishments of religion are rare.3 One would expect that a constitu-
tion that expressly includes a non-establishment principle would be
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham University; J.D. New
York University School of Law; LL.M. Temple University School of Law.
1 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) is the first Supreme Court case to
discuss the scope of the clause.
2 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (excluding students enrolled in pro-
grams preparing for ministry from Washington State Scholarship program is
permissible to allow the state to pursue non-establishment values).
3 See Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives or Freedom of Conscience and Religion in
the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REv. 467, 489 (2001).
more vigilant in protecting Jefferson's "wall of separation"4 than one
with no such provision. But an examination of non-establishment
cases in the United States Supreme Court and similar cases in the
Supreme Court of Canada seems to contradict this logical conclusion.
Canadian cases demonstrate that free exercise principles alone de-
mand at least a degree of enforced separation between religion and
government.
A pair of cases presenting quite similar situations where lo-
cal government bodies opened each legislative session with a spoken
prayer, one in the United States Supreme Court,5 the other in Cana-
da,6 presents a striking contrast. The Canadian Court, using freedom
of religion analysis, in the absence of an establishment clause, re-
quires a greater degree of non-establishment restraint on govern-
ment than placed by the United States Supreme Court applying an
express Establishment Clause. Might this suggest that, paradoxically,
regarding the Establishment Clause as something standing alone and
apart from free exercise principles actually leads to under-
enforcement of non-establishment principles?
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE CASES
A. Town of Greece v. Galloway
The town of Greece, New York is a community of 94,000 ad-
jacent to the city of Rochester.7 Prior to 1999, the monthly meeting
of the town board, at which the board conducted business and was
open to being addressed by citizens, was opened with a moment of
silence.8 In 1999, the newly elected supervisor decided to open
meetings with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer
4 The phrase originated in THOMAS JEFFERSON, LETTER TO A COMMITTEE OF THE
DANBURY BAPTIST AssOcIATION (Jan. 1, 1802). The phrase was invoked by Justice
Black in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
5 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. _ (2014); 134 S. Ct. 1811.
6 Mouvement Laique Qubb6cois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015]2 S.C.R.
3 (Can.).
7 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
8 Id.
[Vol. 14344 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
20161 NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES
delivered by a local clergyman who was-designated as "chaplain of
the month."9
From 1999 to 2007, all of the invited chaplains were Chris-
tian.'0 Their invocations ranged from rather generic theism to specif-
ically Christian references." In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Ste-
phens, who often attended town board meetings, brought suit in
federal court, claiming that the town's invocation practice was a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause.12 They did not seek a complete
end to invocations, but rather that invocations be limited to "inclu-
sive and ecumenical prayer."13
Relying on Marsh v. Chambers,14 the 1983 decision of the Su-
preme Court permitting prayer by a legislative chaplain in the Ne-
braska legislature, the district court dismissed the complaint.5 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed.'6 Applying the "non-
endorsement" test forged by Justice O'Connor, which considered
whether a government practice conveys a message of endorsement
of a religious message, the court found that the "steady drumbeat of
Christian prayer," combined with a failure to actively seek out non-
Christian chaplains, "ensured a Christian viewpoint" and did violate
the non-endorsement standard.7
While the case progressed, the town invited a Jewish layman
and the chairman of a local Baha'i temple to deliver invocations, and
granted a request from. a Wiccan priestess to do the same.8 The
great majority of invocations, however, continued to be delivered by
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. ("Greece neither reviewed the prayers in advance of the meetings nor pro-
vided guidance as to their tone or content.").
12 Id. at 1817.
13 Id
14 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska Legislature's
practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a state-paid chap-
lain).
1s Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 241-43 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
16 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012).
17 Id. at 30-32. The non-endorsement test was set forth and applied by Justice
O'Connor in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
18 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1817.
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Christian clergy.19 Although this limited outreach was intended to
strengthen the town's legal position, it seems to have had little, if
any, effect on the Justices of the Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion relied primarily on the
Court's decision in Marsh.20 To Justice Kennedy, Marsh was signifi-
cant not merely for its narrow holding concerning legislative prayer,
but also for the proposition that a long historical acceptance of a
practice could outweigh the conclusion that such a practice might fail
any of the Court's suggested modern analytical approaches to Estab-
21lishment cases.
Drawing on the language of Marsh and the history of specifi-
cally Christian invocations in early Congressional history,22 Justice
Kennedy rejected the argument that permissible legislative prayer
must be nonsectarian.23 The only limitation that the Court would
place on the prayers was that they not "denigrate nonbelievers or re-
ligious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion."4 Alt-
hough the town need not make "an effort to achieve religious balanc-
ing, 2 5 the opinion at least strongly suggests that the town may not
discriminate against a representative of any religion who comes
forward wishing to deliver an invocation.
19 Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[N]early all of the prayers given reflected
a single denomination.").
20 Id. at 1817-28 (citing Marsh fourteen times, with County ofAllegheny coming
in second with eight citations) (majority opinion).
21 Justice Kennedy dismisses the non-endorsement test as dictum, id at 1821,
and maintains that the prayer creates no constitutional problems under a non-
coercion test, since dissenters would be free to enter or leave without standing
out as disrespectful, id. at 1828. To Justice Kennedy, this distinguishes legisla-
tive prayer from prayer at public high school graduations, which, writing for the
Court, he found psychologically coercive and therefore unconstitutional. Id.; Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
22 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1820.
23 Id. ("The decidedly Christian nature of these [Congressional] prayers must
not be dismissed as the relic of a time when our Nation was less pluralistic than
it is today.").
24 Id. at 1823-24 (finding that only a "course and practice over'time" of such in-
vocations would raise constitutional problems; an occasional disparagement of
religious dissenters would not be sufficient).
25 Id. at 1824.
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The dissenting Justices did not challenge Marsh itself, nor did
they call for an outright ban on prayer by local legislative bodies. Jus-
tice Kagan distinguished Marsh by pointing to the fact that the local
town board meetings included ordinary citizens as participants as
well as observers.26 When dealing with citizen requests, the town
board is acting more like a court vis-A-vis the request, and just as it
would be improper to begin a court session with a sectarian prayer,
so also here a citizen whose religious (or non-religious) convictions
are inconsistent with those reflected in the invocation will legiti-
mately feel alienated from her government.27
This difference, Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues
concluded, requires that local legislative prayer be permitted only
where the town has taken steps not only to include representatives
of non-majority views in the roster of "chaplain of the month," but
also to see that the invocations themselves are nonsectarian and in-
clusive.28
B. Movement Laique Quebec6is v. Saguenay (City)
The city of Saguenay, Quebec, was founded in 2002 by the
consolidation of seven smaller municipalities.29 The regular meetings
of the Saguenay municipal council, open to the public, are held in the
borough hall of three of the seven communities that comprise Sag-
uenay.30 At the start of each public council meeting, the mayor would
deliver a prayer. The short body of the prayer made no specific de-
nominational references, but the prayer began and ended with the
mayor reciting (in French), "In the name of the Father, the Son and
the Holy Spirit," while making the sign of the cross.
Alain Simoneau, an atheist Saguenay resident who regularly
attended council meetings, asked the mayor to stop the practice of
2 6 Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 1844-45.
28 Id. at 1850 ("[T]he government must take especial care to ensure that the
prayers [citizens] hear will seek to include, rather than serve to divide.").
29 Mouvement LaYque Qubb6cois v. City of Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2
S.C.R. 3, para. 5 (Can.).
3 Id at para. 6.
3 1 /d. at para. 6-7.
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the invocation.32 The mayor refused, and Simoneau brought his com-
plaint to the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal, which found that the
City's by-law calling for prayer was inconsistent with the Quebec
Charter of Rights, as it protected Simoneau's freedom of conscience
and religion.3 3 The purpose of the by-law was, in the Tribunal's view,
entirely religious and inconsistent with the government's duty of re-
ligious neutrality.34
The City successfully appealed to the Quebec Court of Ap-
peal.35 The court found that the prayer, as an invocation of universal
values, did not violate the duty of neutrality, and in addition, Simo-
neau's injury, if any, was trivial and insubstantial. The Supreme
Court of Canada allowed Simoneau's appeal, and invalidated the
City's prayer practices.37 In an opinion sharply in contrast to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Town of Greece, Justice Gas-
con, writing for a unanimous Court, held that "consciously adhering
to certain religious beliefs to the exclusion of all others . . . [breach-
es] the state's duty of neutrality" and interferes with Simoneau's
freedom of conscience and religion.
Both the Quebec Charter39 and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" contain provisions that guarantee freedom of
conscience and freedom of religion. In contrast to the United States
Constitution, neither of these Charters contains an-express equiva-
lent of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Although Justice
Gascon noted that neither the Quebec nor the Canadian Charter con-
tains an express requirement of government neutrality on matters of
religion, such a "duty results from an evolving interpretation of free-
dom of conscience and religion."4 1 This interpretation leads to the
32 Id. at para. 8.
33 Id. at para.14-17.
34 Id at para. 16.
as Id. at para. 18-22.
36 Id. at para. 21.
37 Id. at para. 150.
38 Id. at para. 4.
39 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, C.Q.L.R. C-12 § 3 (Can.).
40 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c. 11, s. 2 http://canlii.ca/t/dsx#sec2.
41 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 71.
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conclusion that the state must maintain a neutrality that "requires
that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the
same holds true for non-belief."4 2
In its resolution calling for the maintenance of the public
prayer, the Saguenay Council members had asserted their own rights
of religious expression. But Justice Gascon declared that "[w]hen the
state adheres to a belief, it is not merely expressing an opinion on
the subject. It is creating a hierarchy of beliefs and casting doubt on
the value of those it does not share. It is also ranking the individuals
who hold such beliefs."43
The Court of Appeal had found the prayer practice consistent
with what it termed "benevolent neutrality," which was sufficient
because the neutrality requirement should not be interpreted to re-
quire "complete secularity" by government." Justice Gascon denied
that complete secularity was at issue, but rather maintained that
true neutrality required that the state "neither encourage nor dis-
courage" religion, and that such encouragement violates Charter
principles regardless of whether the religious practice is done "un-
der the guise of cultural or historical reality or heritage.45
In analyzing the City's prayer practices under this require-
ment of neutrality, Justice Gascon began with a two-part test, which
closely resembles the first two parts of the Lemon test used by the
United States Supreme Court in Establishment Clause cases." First,
"[a] provision of a statute, of regulations or of a by-law will be inop-
erative if its purpose is religious.4 7 The second step is to examine
42 Id. at para. 72.
43 Id. at para. 73 (quoting R. Moon, Freedom of Religion Under the Charter of
Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality, 45 U.B.C. L. REV. 497, 507 (2012) ("If reli-
gion is an aspect of an individual's identity, then when the state treats his or her
religious practices or beliefs as less important or less true than the practices of
others, or when it marginalizes his or her religious community in some way, it
is not simply rejecting the individual's views and values, it is denying his or her
equal worth.").
44 Id. at para. 77.
45 Id. at para. 78.
46 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (finding that Establishment Clause is
violated if government practice lacks secular purpose, has primarily religious
effect, or entangles government with religion).
47Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 44, para. 81.
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the effect of the practice. Here, the analysis diverges from Lemon to
some extent. The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the
"primary effect" of the government action is religious or secular.4 8
With the neutrality requirement of the Quebec and Canadian Char-
ters being grounded in the rights of the individual, the question is
whether the state practice has "the effect of interfering with the indi-
vidual's freedom of conscience and religion, that is, impeding the in-
dividual's ability to act in accordance with his or her beliefs" in a
non-trivial way.49
Both the Quebec and the Canadian Charters provide that a
provision of a statute or regulation that interferes with a range of in-
dividual rights, including the right to freedom of conscience or reli-
gion, may be justified under a proportionality test. Section 1 of the
Canadian Charter states that an infringement may be allowed if the
state can show that it is a reasonable limit in a free and democratic
society.50 Although the language of the analogous provision of the
Quebec Charter is not precisely the same, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has held that the analysis of each of these provisions is the
same.51
The analysis for determining whether a limit on freedom of
conscience or religion can be justified consists of the following steps:
(1) that the legislative objective is of sufficient
importance, in the sense that it relates to press-
ing and substantial concerns, and (2) that the
means chosen to achieve the objective are pro-
portional. The second requirement has three
components: (i) the means chosen must be ra-
tionally connected to the objective; (ii) they
must impair the right in question as little as
possible; and (iii) they must not so severely
48 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
49 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 45 para. 85.
50 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), section 1.
s Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, C.Q.L.R. C-12 § 9.1 provides: "In ex-
ercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper
regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the cit-
izens of Quebec."
350
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trench on individual or group rights that the ob-
jective is outweighed by the seriousness of the
intrusion.52
Although some of the language of this test, particularly that of (2)(ii);
seems to resemble the United States Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
test,53 its application has been somewhat more deferential to gov-
ernment than strict scrutiny, at least in its classic form, has been.54
Justice Gascon's opinion focused on the religious nature of the prayer
practice, dismissing the City's arguments that these were secular jus-
tifications.55 In the absence of an important legislative objective, little
attention would need to be paid to the rest of the proportionality
test.
The City argued that a non-denominational prayer did not
qualify as an improper religious practice.56 Although the Court noted
that the prayer was quite distinctly Roman Catholic, even assuming
that it was non-denominational would not change its religious na-
ture.57 By excluding agnostics and atheists, the practice interfered
with liberty of conscience.
The City claimed that it was merely honoring tradition,59 Jus-
tice Gascon dismissed this claim, however, noting that the practice
dated only from 2002.6 Further, the Court noted that while the state
has legitimate ability to celebrate and preserve its religious heritage,
this does not justify the use of public power to actually profess a
municipality's "own faith.>61
52Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 47 para. 90.
ss Under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54 See generally ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMs 68-87 (4th ed. 2009).
55Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 49-51 paras. 96-102.
56 Id. at para. 95. The City argued that objecting to non-denominational prayer
would "give atheism and agnosticism precedence over religion." Id
7 Id. at para. 135-140.
ss Id. at para. 92.
591d. at para. 98.
601d.
61 Id. at para. 116.
Just as the town of Greece analogized its practice to the invo-
cations delivered by Senate and House of Representatives chaplains,
and sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh,62 Sag-
uenay pointed to the practice of an opening prayer by the Speaker of
the Canadian House of Commons.6 3 But unlike the United States Su-
preme Court in Town of Greece, Justice Gascon did not find the analo-
gy persuasive.
The context of the two prayers, Justice Gascon notes, are dif-
ferent." Although he did not elaborate on this point, this may be the
difference noted by the dissenters in Town of Greece between local
and state or congressional egislative prayer.65 At the local event, cit-
izens are at least potential, if not actual, participants, rather than
passive observers." This makes religious messages that send a mes-
sage of non-inclusion to non-members of the legislative body more
significant. Additionally, Justice Gascon noted that the House of
Commons prayer may be protected from judicial interference by par-
liamentary privilege, making it sui generis and not comparable to lo-
cal government bodies.67
Finally, Saguenay pointed to the preamble of the Canadian
Charter, which declares that "Canada is founded upon principles that
recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law,"6 to argue that a
theistic prayer requiring the same supremacy could not violate the
Charter.69 But the Court held that the general statement of the "polit-
ical theory" underlying the provisions of the Charter could not serve
to limit the express individual rights protections of the Charter."
Thus, Justice Gascon concluded that the original tribunal's findings
were justified, and that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning
them: "The prayer creates a distinction, exclusion and preference
62 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6 3 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 65-66, paras. 141-143.
64 Id. at para. 142.
65 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. - (2014); 134 S. Ct. 1811,
1842-45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
6 6 See id. at 1824, 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting.).
67 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 66, para. 142.
68 Id. at para. 145.
69 Id. at para. 144.
70 Id. at para. 147.
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based on religion that has the effect of impairing Mr. Simoneau's
right to full and equal exercise of his freedom of conscience and reli-
gion."71
III. NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES: WITH OR WITHOUT AN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Town of Greece and City of Saguenay present a paradox.
Faced with very similar cases challenging prayer at the outset of offi-
cial business meetings of local legislative bodies, the United States
Supreme Court, interpreting a Constitution containing an express
prohibition on establishment of religion, found the practice unobjec-
tionable, while the Supreme Court of Canada, in the absence of any
such provision in either the Quebec or Canadian Charters, found the
practice unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom of conscience
or religion of non-believers.
To what extent is the neutrality principle at the heart of non-
establishment dependent on an express separationist provision in a
state's constitutional documents? Might it be better to conceive of
the neutrality/non-establishment principle as a corollary of individ-
ual freedom of religion rather than an independent limit on govern-
ment? Does the presence of an express non-establishment clause re-
quire limits on government beyond the neutrality implicit in the
provisions protecting freedom of religion?
The twentieth century gave rise to widespread recognition of
the obligation of governments to respect religious freedom. After
World War I, the Covenant of the League of Nations required states
that had been granted mandates to govern territories and prepare
them for self-governance guarantee freedom of conscience and reli-
72
gion. After World War II, the United Nations adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, including Article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion; this right includes freedom to
71 Id at para. 15O.
72 See generally NATHAN LERNER, Religious Human Rights Under the United Na-
tions, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79-
84 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte eds. 1996).
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change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.73
In 1981, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief.74 The Declaration begins with these
provisions:
Article I
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall in-
clude freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and.teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his
choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals or the fundamental rights and free-
doms of others.
Article 2
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any
State, institution, or group of persons, or person on
the grounds of religion or other belief.75
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. GAOR, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), Art. 18.
74 Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36t Session (1981).
7 Id. at arts. 1-2.
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Of course, not all nations have adhered to these principles, but for
our purposes, a focus on those that do will be sufficient. The Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights adopts, almost word for word, the
conscience and religious provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and also provides a mechanism for citizens to bring
claims of violation of those rights before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights.7 6 In Kokkinakis v. Greece,77 the European Court held that
a criminal conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for illegal proselytizing
was a violation of the Convention.78 Additionally, in Darby v. Swe-
den,79 the Court held that a non-member of the established Swedish
Lutheran Church was entitled to an exemption from a tax that sup-
ported that Church, at least to the extent that the tax supported spe-
cifically religious rather than broadly charitable activity.80
Notably, however, the European Court has never suggested
that a government may never privilege an established faith. None of
the international conventions noted above expressly prohibit estab-
lishment or insist upon strict neutrality on religious questions. Alt-
hough the constitutions of some European nations expressly declare
the separation of church and state,8' or at least government neutrali-
ty as between religions,82 other states have formally established
76 See T. JEREMY GUNN, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, at 305-360 (1996).
77 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1993).
78 Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1990); GUNN, supra note 76, at
316-25.
79 The European Commission, the body that initially evaluates complaints under
the European Convention on Human Rights, found that Article 9 was violated by
the requirement hat a dissenter pay a tax earmarked for a specifically religious
activity. Upon review, the Court agreed that the tax on Dr. Darby was improper,
but based its ruling on the fact that he was denied an exemption from the tax
because he was only a part-time resident of Sweden, while full-time residents
were entitled to claim exemption as dissenters. See GUNN, supra note 76, at 316-
18.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., CONSTITUCICAO DA REPUBLICA PORTEGUESA 1982, art. 41(4) (Port.); LA
CONSTITUTION, 1958, ar. 1 (Fr.).
82 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND, 1957, Art 44.722.
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churches, or at least recognize one religion as having a unique place
in the nation's history and culture."
The European Court has not challenged government financial
support to religion. In Darby, the Court did not criticize Sweden's
system insofar as it taxed members of the established church for that
church's support.8 Some have noted that the European Court and
Commission grant more deference not only to established churches,
but also to members of "mainstream" religions, as opposed to new or
non-traditional faiths."
Thus, in the view of the European Court, individual rights of
religious freedom do not necessarily imply government neutrality
among religions, or government neutrality between religion and ir-
religion. When the dissenting Evangelical Lutheran Church in Swe-
den challenged mandatory religious education in Swedish public
schools conducted under the auspices of the established Swedish Lu-
theran Church, the European Commission negotiated a settlement
granting Evangelical Lutherans an exemption.86 When an atheist
sought a similar exemption from the same law, the Commission dis-
missed the claim as "manifestly ill-founded."87
This cautious application of religious freedom principles, af-
firming individual freedom claims while not objecting to unequal
state treatment of religions, is likely a consequence of an interna-
tional body exerting restraint in framing rules that will bind different
a3 See, e.g., KATAETATIKO [CONSTITUTION], 1975, art. 3 (Greece) (establishing the
Eastern Orthodox Church); NORGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION], 1814, art. 16 (Nor.)
(establishing the Evangelical Lutheran Church); Act of Supremacy 1 Eliz., c. 1
(1558) (establishing the Church of England).
84 GUNN, supra note 76, at 312 (quoting Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sec.
A) (1990)) ("[A] State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate
Article 9 of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting
States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and when
they became parties to it.").
85 Gunn found that, with only two exceptions, "the European Commission al-
ways denied applications from religions that could be called 'new', 'minority', or
'nontraditional."' GUNN, supra note 76, at 311.
86 Karnell v. Sweden, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Cony. On H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.).
87 Angelini v. Sweden, App. No. 10941/883, 51 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41,
49 (1987). Karnell, Angelini and other cases rejecting claims made by adherents
to minority religions are discussed by GUNN, supra note 76 at 311-12.
[Vol. 14356 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
2016] NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES
societies with different histories concerning the relationship of
church and state. This is consistent with the general principle that
the European Court will respect a "margin of appreciation" for par-
ticular national history and culture in adjudicating rights claims.88
But some western democracies, with or without specific constitu-
tional provisions mandating separation or neutrality, have been
more sensitive to the relationship between non-establishment prin-
ciples and individual rights. Canada provides a clear example.
As a British colony, Canada was familiar with the formal reli-
gious establishment practiced in the United Kingdom. But the reli-
gious diversity caused by the Francophile and largely Roman Catho-
lic Quebec, a single denomination establishment was not a practical
89
option. Instead, Canadian constitutionalism from the Constitution
Act of 1867 through the middle of the twentieth century was largely
devoted to negotiating the degree to which dominant religious ma-
jorities-Catholics in Quebec or Protestants in other provinces-
needed to respect minority religious rights in matters such as educa-
tion and marriage.9 Although some respect was given to Protestant
or Catholic minorities, rights of non-Christian minorities received
much less attention.9'
Canada inherited the British doctrine of parliamentary su-
premacy, and the original Canadian constitutional documents did not
empower courts to overturn legislative decisions as violative of indi-
vidual rights.92 Thus, when the widespread movement among west-
88 See generally PETER G. DANCHIN & LISA FORMAN, The Evolving Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192-99
(Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole, eds.)(2002).
89 See generally JANET Epp BUCKINGHAM, FIGHTING OVER GOD: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CANADA, 7-18 (2014).
9 0 Id at 32-69 (education issues); id. at 151-64 (marriage and divorce).
91 Id. at 13 ("[Tlhe dominance of Roman Catholic-Protestant conflict overshad-
owed consideration of the rights of religious minorities."). After the cultural
changes in Quebec during the post-World War II era, that led to far less influ-
ence by the Catholic Church in government and social norms, referred to as the
"Quiet Revolution," self-definition by Canadians became less focused on the
Catholic-Protestant divide and more on English-French language differences. Id.
at 18-19.
9 2See SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 54, at 4-5.
357
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
ern democracies toward recognition of individual rights following
World War II came to Canada, it initially resulted in legislation at
both the national and provincial levels recognizing rights, including
the right of religious freedom.93 Finally, after years of pressure for
the adoption of a bill of rights with constitutional status, the incorpo-
ration of a charter of rights became a priority when the government
of Prime Minister Trudeau embarked on the task of constitutional
revision in 1980.94
Thus, the first thirty-four sections of the Constitution Act of
1982 comprise the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 9 Canada's first
constitutionally entrenched individual rights protections. The list of
protected rights is largely, but not entirely, similar to those protect-
ed by the-United States Constitution.96 Section 1 of the Charter ex-
pressly provides for a form of judicial balancing in interpreting the
scope of the enumerated rights, making it clear that rights are not
absolute.9 7 This section provides that Charter rights are guaranteed,
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."98
Section 2 of the Charter deals with the same subject matter
as the First Amendment of the United States, but with some textual
differences:
93 Id. at 12-18.
94 See DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 23-46 (1982).
9s Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.). As a consequence
of its history as a British colony, until the 1982 changes to the Canadian Consti-
tution (the Canada Act), constitutional changes needed to be approved by the
former colonial power. See JEREMY WEBBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 26-29 (2015).
96 For example, the Charter contains no equivalent of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms, nor does it contain a "Takings Clause." Section 7 of the Char-
ter, which comes closest to the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, "provides that life, liberty and security of the person" (omitting "proper-
ty") may not be taken away "except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." Canada Act, 1982, § 7. But Section 26, in language remi-
niscent of the Ninth Amendment, states that "[t]he guarantee in this Charter of
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of
any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." Id. at § 26.




Everyone has the following freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
" (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expres-
sion, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.9
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) deal, in somewhat more detail, with the
same freedoms as the speech and press clauses of the First Amend-
ment. The treatment of religion in subsection (a), however, has sig-
nificant differences from the First Amendment religion clauses. In
keeping with national and international documents from the post-
World War II era, a protection is extended to "conscience" as well as
"religion." This would seem to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the
need for courts to determine when a belief system qualifies as a reli-
gion,100 and would presumably bring non-theists and atheists within
the scope of its protection.
A difference of perhaps greater significance is the absence of
any express provision barring government establishment of religion.
How significant is this omission in differentiating the scope of reli-
gious freedom in the United States and Canada? A reasonable hy-
pothesis might posit that Canadian courts would be more tolerant of
government practices that promote religion. Yet, from the first sig-
nificant Canadian decisions interpreting Section 2(a), concerns that
American lawyers would label as "Establishment Clause matters"
were evident and dealt with in a way that demonstrated a commit-
ment to non-establishment values at least as strong as their United
States counterparts.
The first significant decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
interpreting the Charter's guarantee of freedom of conscience and
religion was R v. Big M Drug Mart.10 Big M, charged with selling
goods on Sunday in violation of the Lord's Day Act, challenged that
99 Id. at § 2.
1oo United States courts frequently must address the definition of "religion." See
Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition
of "Religion"?, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (2012).
101 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
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Act as a violation of Section 2(a).1 2 Chief Justice Dickson analyzed
the case in terms that would fit into an Establishment Clause case in
the United States. Initially, the Chief Justice found it significant that
the Lord's Day Act had the purpose of promoting Sunday worship,
rather than the secular purpose of simply providing a uniform day of
rest.103
In focusing on the effect of the Act, Chief Justice Dickson dis-
cussed the meaning of "freedom of religion" under the Charter. He
saw both equal treatment and non-coercion as essential aspects of
the guarantee:
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the ab-
sence of coercion or constraint. If a person is com-
pelled by the state or the will of another to a course,
of action or inaction which he would not otherwise
have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and
he cannot be said to be truly free . . . . Coercion in-
cludes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as
direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain
of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of con-
trol which determine or limit alternative courses of
conduct available to others. 1
The presence or absence of coercion has been decisive in United
States Establishment Clause cases, at least in the opinion of several
Justices.05 Those who use the term do not necessarily agree on its
meaning, however. To Justice Scalia, coercion is present only when
the state imposes a tangible punishment on those who fail to con-
102 R.S.C. 1970 c. L-13. With some exceptions, the Act prohibited commercial ac-
tivity on Sunday. See Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301-02.
103 "Its religious purpose, in compelling sabbatical observance, has been long-
established and consistently maintained . . . ." Big M Drug Mart; [1985] 1 S.C.R.
at 331.
104 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 336-37.
1os See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), discussed infi-a at notes 106-
107. See also Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989). Justice Ken-
nedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, contends that religious holiday
displays are noncoercive and therefore constitutional. Id. at 659-67.
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form.10 Justice Kennedy, in contrast, recognizes the possibility that
psychological pressure can also qualify as coercion.10 7 Chief Justice
Dickson's view of coercion clearly adopts Justice Kennedy's view. In
finding the Lord's Day Act to be coercive, the Chief Justice described
its effect in terms that seem less concerned with coercion and more
with results that are reminiscent of the endorsement of religion
found to be a First Amendment violation under the "non-
endorsement" test first enunciated by Justice O'Connor108 in United
States cases:
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian
Christian ideal, the Lord's Day Act works a form
of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter
and the dignity of all non-Christians. In pro-
claiming the standards of the Christian faith, the
Act creates a climate hostile to, and gives the
appearance of discrimination against, non-
Christian Canadians .... The theological content
of the legislation remains as a subtle and con-
stant reminder to religious minorities within the
country of their differences with, and alienation
from, the dominant religious culture.1
The Attorney General of Alberta, defending the Lord's Day Act,
stressed the absence of any establishment clause in the Charter, and
contended that this omission meant that no statute that did not actu-
ally impede an individual's religious exercise could violate Section
2(a).110 Chief Justice Dickson rejected this argument, noting that "es-
106 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a hall-
mark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious ortho-
doxy and of financial support by force of law and threat ofpenalty.").
107 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (majority opinion) (noting that the Establishment Clause
may protect against "subtle coercive pressure.").
108 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[The] more direct important infringement [of the Establishment Clause] is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to . . . adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the politi-
cal community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
109 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 337.
110 Id. at 339.
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tablishment" and "free exercise" "are not two totally separate and
distinct categories."11' Dickson continued, "[N]either 'free exercise'
nor 'anti-establishment' is a homogeneous category; each contains a
broad spectrum of heterogeneous principles."ll2
Big M did not require the invalidation of all Sunday closing
laws. This became evident shortly after the Big M decision, when the
Supreme Court of Canada refused to invalidate the Ontario Retail
Business Holidays Act.113 The Act prohibited retail business on "holi-
days," defined as including Sundays and a number of additional holi-
days, some but not all of which were of religious significance.H1 4 The
Act also contained an exemption from the prohibition on Sunday
business for small retailers who were closed on the preceding Satur-
day.'15
Applying the analysis of religious purpose and discriminato-
ry effect enunciated in Big M, the Court found these statutory differ-
ences significant.116 The more broad definition of "holidays" estab-
lished a fundamentally secular purpose, and the exemptions
minimized any negative effect on the religious freedom of those who
recognized a-day other than Sunday as a day of rest.'17 The lasting ef-
fect of the decision was minimal, however. In 1993, the Ontario legis-
lature amended the Act to permit retailing on Sunday, while retain-
ing the mandate of closing on a list of specific holidays, some but not
all with religious significance.18
School closings for holiday observance have been challenged
in both Canadian and American courts,119 with mixed results. The
111Id. at 339-40.
112 Id. at 340.
113 R. v. Edwards Books and Arts, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.) (upholding the
Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453 (Can.)).
114 Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 716-17.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 741-44.
117 Id.
18 See BUCKINGHAM, supra note 89, at 139.
119 See e.g., Islamic School Federation v. Ottawa School Board, [1997] 99 O.A.C.
127, 145 D.L.R. 4th 659 (Can., Ont. Div. Ct.) (holding that it was not a violation of
the Charter to close schools for Christmas and Easter, but not for Islamic holi-
days); Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding statewide clos-
ings in Illinois of public schools on Good Friday unconstitutional); Commack v.
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Ontario Divisional Court upheld school closings for Christmas and
Easter holidays, on the grounds that the holidays have become "secu-
lar holidays or common pause days"1 2 0 rather than simply religious
observations. Applying the First Amendment to a similar challenge
concerning the closure of public schools in Hawaii for a long Easter
weekend, the district court found that the long history of such a clo-
sure has turned observance into a "spring [weekend]," one with sec-
ular overtones.121
No question involving church-state relations in the United
States has caused more controversy than the issue of prayer in pub-
lic schools.122 Unsurprisingly, this issue has arisen in Canada as well.
Section 28(1) of Regulation 262, issued under Ontario's Education
Act, provided that the public elementary school day would begin
with the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and a Scripture reading.12 3
Although parents could request exemptions from.the recitation for
their children, the parents of children attending Sudbury public
schools sought a ruling that the regulation was invalid as a violation
of Section 2(a).124 The parents maintained that the peer pressure on
their children not to exempt themselves made the right to seek ex-
emptions largely illusory.125
Despite the absence of a non-establishment principle in the
Charter, the Ontario Court of Appeal sustained the challenge, in an
analysis largely similar to that used by the United States courts in Es-
tablishment Clause cases involving school prayer:
The three appellants chose not to seek an ex-
emption from religious exercises because of
Waibee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that public school closings on
Good Friday are not a violation of the Establishment Clause).
120 Islamic School Federation, 145 D.L.R. 4th at 661.
121 Commack, 932 F.2d at 778. But see Metzl, 57 F.3d 618 (employing a contrary
analysis of a similar Illinois requirement).
122 See, e.g., Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating
state mandated Bible recitation in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (invalidating the practice of beginning the public school day with orga-
nized prayer).
123 Education Act, R.S.O. 1980 c. 129 (Can); R.R.O. Req. 262 s. 78(1) (Can.).
124 Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. Of Education, [1988] 52 D.L.R. 4th 577 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
125 Id. at 591.
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their concern about differentiating their chil-
dren from other pupils. The peer pressure and
the classroom norms to which children are
acutely sensitive, in our opinion, are real and
pervasive and operate to compel members of re-
ligious minorities to conform with majority reli-
gious practices.126
Dissenting Judge Lacourciere argued that the right to seek exemp-
tion eliminated the coercive element of the program and distin-
guished the case from Big M.1 2 7 In addition, Judge Lacourciere object-
ed to the court's application of an analysis similar to earlier United
States cases, specifically calling attention to the absence of an estab-
lishment clause in the Canadian Constitution.128 The majority was not
convinced, however, that the Canadian Constitution calls for "a
bridge between church and state rather than a wall of separation."29
Similarly, in 1990, the Ontario Court of Appeal invalidated a
program of religious education in Ontario public schools.13 0 The pro-
gram originally focused entirely on Christianity, but in recent years
had added references to other religions. 131As was the case with
school prayer, parents could seek exemptions for their children.132
Ontario defended the program as a way of promoting character, eth-
126 Id.
127 Judge Lacourciere wrote:
In contrast to the legislation impugned in Big M, it is
clear that s. 28 does not seek to compel participation in
exercise with a religious component by all public school
children. I agree that indirect forms of coercion may re-
sult in a Charter violation, but whatever may be the in-
direct effect of the regulation, it cannot reasonably be
suggested that its purpose is to compel participation in
these exercises when the exemption is cast in such
broad terms.
Id. at 604 (Lacourciere, J., dissenting).
1 28 Id. at 608 (Lacouriere, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 609 (Lacourciere, J., dissenting).
130 Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] 65
D.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. Ont. CA.).
131 Id. at 7-8.
132 Id. at 6-8.
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ics, and moral values, but the court concluded that the purpose and
effect of the program was to promote Christian beliefs as norma-
tive.1 33
Although the public school cases could easily fit into the
mainstream of United States Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
one aspect of Canadian church-state law involving schools is clearly
distinct from the American model. This is the question of direct pub-
lic funding of religious schools. The close connection between reli-
gion, language and culture that has been so much a part of Canada's
attempt to unite English and French speaking communities, while al-
lowing them to retain their own identities has led to some specific
constitutional choices that require less of a separationist position on
aid to religious schools.134 Section 93 of Canada's original constitu-
tional document, the Constitution Act of 1867, grants exclusive con-
trol of education to the provincial governments, and also preserves
the rights and privileges of denominational schools existing by virtue
of statutes in effect at that time.'35 In 1928, it was held that Section
93 gave the provinces broad authority to determine the degree of
public funding of religious schools.136 In 1984, however, after enact-
ment of the Charter, when the government of Ontario sought to ex-
pand public funding for Catholic schools beyond grade 10 to include
all secondary school grades, the enactment was challenged as a vio-
lation of both Section 2(a) and the principle of equal treatment found
in Section 15(1).137
The Canadian Supreme Court did not disagree that standing
alone, the Charter provisions would seem to prohibit provincial aid
to religious schools, but went on to hold that the Charter was not in-
133 Id. at 28-39. The program was still heavily weighted toward Christianity. In
addition, material on non-Christian religions was primarily historical and de-
scriptive, while discussion of Christianity included much more on theory and
belief. Id.
134 See generally, BUCKINGHAM, supra note 89, at 3-31.
13s Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 93 (U.K.).
136 For a discussion of the history of disputes concerning § 93, see BUCKINGHAM,
supra note 89, at 38-45.
137 In re An Act to Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can. Ont.).
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tended to override Section 93 of the Constitution Act of 1867.13s The
express provisions of Section 93 create a clear contrast on this issue
between Canadian and American church-state jurisprudence.139 In
this instance, as we might expect, the constitutional system that ex-
pressly provides for non-establishment is more restrictive on gov-
ernment aid. The implication of the Canadian Supreme Court's rea-
soning, however, is clear that without the express authority given to
the provinces by Section 93, the aid to Catholic schools would be
constitutionally problematic.
The most factually similar precedent in Canadian appellate
courts to City of Saguenay was decided in 1999 by the Ontario Court
of Appeal.'4 The mayor and council of the town of Penetanguishene
opened each council meeting with a recitation of the Lord's Prayer.141
Foreshadowing the decision in City of Saguenay, the court held that
the practice infringed the religious freedom of non-Christian resi-
dents who wanted to attend the open meeting.142
The court found it "clear that the purpose of the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer at the opening of council meetings is to impose a
Christian moral tone on the deliberations of council." 43 The town ar-
gued that this was quite different than the-school prayer at issue in
Zylberberg, in that adults would feel no more than a trivial degree of
coercive peer pressure.1" The court responded that while children
may be more vulnerable, the adults, "[j]ust as children[,] are entitled
to attend public schools and be free of coercion or pressure to con-
form to the religious practices of the majority, so everyone is entitled
138 Id. at 1196 ("The Charter cannot be applied so as to abrogate or derogate
from rights or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution.").
139 See generally Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: San-
ta Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM & MARY
L. REv. 771 (2001)-(providing an overview of the United States Supreme Court's
history dealing with government aid to religious schools).
140 Freitag v. Town of Penetanguishene, [1999] 179 D.L.R. 4th 150 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
141Id. at 157.
142 Id. at 162.
143 Id. at 157.
144Id. at 162.
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to attend public local council meetings and to enjoy the same free-
dom."1 45
The court was unimpressed with the argument that
longstanding tradition should insulate the prayer from constitutional
scrutiny. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in the United States
Supreme Court decision in Marsh'4 was cited to emphasize that
changing times and attitudes can transform a practice once offensive
to no one, but later "highly offensive to many persons, the deeply de-
vout and the nonbelievers alike."1 4 7 The court, however, did suggest
that a brief non-sectarian prayer might be a constitutionally ac-
ceptable alternative to the identifiably Christian Lord's Prayer.
When we review the Canadian cases under the Charter that
most closely resemble disputes that the United States would analyze
as Establishment Clause cases, we can see an interesting pattern.
Putting aside the question of government aid to religious schools, an
issue specifically dealt with by the Constitution Act of 1867 in a way
untouched by the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada has reached
decisions that are at least as respectful of what Americans would
classify as non-establishment principles as United States decisions.
And in the specific case of legislative prayer at the level of local gov-
ernment, the Canadian Supreme Court has been more sensitive to
these principles. And this is so despite the absence of any analog of
the First Amendment Establishment Clause in the Charter or any
other provision of Canada's constitution. What can we learn from the
Canadian Supreme Court's focus on the threat to individual religious
freedom posed by government support for religion that might be
helpful in clarifying United States First Amendment jurisprudence?
IV. NON-ESTABLISHMENT: A SEPARATE PRINCIPLE OR A NECESSARY ASPECT
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?
Some would dismiss an inquiry into what insights foreign
court interpretations of their own constitutional provisions might
145 Id.
146 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147 Freitag, [1999] 179 D.L.R. 4th at 165 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
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provide for American courts as they interpret United States constitu-
tional law.148 Although courts of other common law nations frequent-
ly draw on American cases for persuasive authority in cases involv-
ing individual rights, it has been extremely rare to find the United
States Supreme Court citing foreign law.149 While occasional separate
opinions from a Justice might suggest hat other nations' experiences
might "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solu-
tions to a common legal problem,"15 0 the Court's prevailing position,
as most clearly articulated by Justice Scalia, has been that compara-
tive constitutional analysis is helpful only when drafting, rather than
interpreting, a constitution.is5
Certainly, where a foreign constitution reflects a basic choice
of values inconsistent with the United States Constitution, compara-
tive analysis makes little sense. Where foreign law is equally com-
mitted to common values, a different picture emerges. A commit-
ment to religious freedom has become a widely accepted
international norm, one embraced by all western democracies. The
scope of this freedom has evolved, both in the United States, where
nineteenth century mere toleration of religious minorities has grown
to, at least, equal treatment of all faiths, and in other nations, even
those where a formal establishment still exists.15 2 This would suggest
that the scope of religious freedom, and its relationship to non-
148 This position is most closely associated with Justice Scalia. See Printz v. Unit-
ed States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (maintaining that a comparative analysis with
other countries may be relevant in writing a constitution, but not in interpret-
ing one).
149 See, e.g., R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 ("[It is natural and even desir-
able for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional jurisprudence in
seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts
in the United States Constitution"). But at the same time, courts "[s]hould be
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different
countries, in different ages." Id.
1so See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1s1 See In re An Act to Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can. Ont.).
152 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text For the evolution of church-
state law in nineteenth century United States at the state level, prior to the ap-
plication of the First Amendment to the states, see STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND
DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURYAMERICA (2010).
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establishment principles, is a subject on which foreign law may pro-
vide helpful insight.
The presence of two separate First Amendment clauses deal-
ing with religion has led to significant difficulty in interpretation. On
the surface, there seems to be a degree of conflict between the Estab-
lishment Clause, which suggests that government disregard religion
in its decisions, and the Free Exercise Clause, which suggests that
sensitivity to religion is sometimes required. For judges and others
analyzing constitutional claims involving religion, the presence of
two clauses would seem to require an initial decision of whether a
case essentially presents an establishment or a free exercise issue.
While different tests have emerged for analysis of problems arising
under each clause, it should be obvious that any case involving gov-
ernment and religion presents concerns touching the values behind
each clause.
In some cases, the coexistence of non-establishment and free
exercise values is obvious and discussed explicitly by courts. In Locke
v. Davey,153 for example, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the
State of Washington's rule disallowing participation in a state pro-
gram of merit scholarships by those pursuing a college-level pro-
gram preparing the student for the ministry. 154 The majority of the
Court permitted Washington to pursue non-establishment values by
refusing to fund preparation for ministry,s15 while the dissenters saw
this as state discrimination against religion, essentially the type of
state action infringing free exercise values.156 From the earliest days
of Establishment Clause cases, defenders of state practices, such as
government aid to religiously affiliated schools, or the presence of
prayer in public schools, have defended the programs as no more
than attempts to eliminate discrimination against religious institu-
tions,157 or recognition of believers' free exercise rights within a pub-
153 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
154 Id. at 715.
1ss Id. at 719-25.
156 Id. at 726-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("[W]e must be
careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from ex-
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lic forum.158 Similarly, opponents of religiously based exemptions
from legal obligations have characterized them as improper gov-
ernment favoritism, implicating non-establishment values.59
The overlap of Establishment Clause and free exercise values
may explain recent trends in the Supreme Court's application of each
clause. Establishment Clause cases have moved in a more accommo-
dationist direction, both in contexts involving government financial
aid to religious institutions,16 and government symbolic support of
religion.161 At the same time, the Court's application of the Free Exer-
cise Clause has been limited to instances of government hostility to
religion 62-a development that, implicitly at least, recognizes non-
establishment values. While the two clauses seem to converge
somewhat at the level of First Amendment analysis, the Court has
made it clear that at the state level, governments may extend free
exercise protection under their own constitutions beyond the First
Amendment limits without creating non-establishment problems,16 3
tending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief.").
1ss See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 323 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of permitting student-led invoca-
tions at high school football games, suggesting that the Court's decision imping-
es on the students' free exercise rights).
159 In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court significantly expanded the definition of "religion"
in the Selective Service Act to include belief systems beyond those professing
traditional theistic beliefs. Justice Harlan concurred, despite his view that this
was clearly contrary to legislative intent, on the ground that an exemption from
the military draft available only to members of traditionally defined religions
would create a serious Establishment Clause problem. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356-
61 (Harlan, J. concurring).
160 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revision-
ism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
16 1 See Lupu, supra note 139, at 791-72.
162 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Or-
den v. Perry, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 7 (2005).
163 Compare Emp't Div. Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (finding no free exercise exemption required from neutral statute of
general applicability), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (requiring free exercise exemption where religion is sin-
gled out for hostile treatment).
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or, as in Locke, enforce non-establishment principles of their state
constitutions beyond the requirements of the First Amendment.16
The presence of non-establishment principles and free exer-
cise principles in any case involving government and religion means
that a court must decide which set of principles dominates in a par-
ticular case. That decision will likely lead a court to classify a case as
an Establishment Clause or a Free Exercise Clause case, but the label
will be less significant than the degree of deference given to each
principle in the court's analysis. This allows us to see how Canadian
courts have come to interpret religious freedom as including some
degree of non-establishment, despite he absence of an establish-
ment clause in the Canadian Charter.
If any case involving government and religion calls for some
degree of balancing principles, how much weight should be given to
each? We would expect constitutional text to be of at least some as-
sistance here. Before discussing the significance of the existence or
absence of an express non-establishment clause, we might note a
possible significant textual difference between the scope of the reli-
gious freedom principle in the United States and Canadian Constitu-
tions.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment expressly
protects only "religion."165 The Canadian Charter, in contrast, but in
keeping with the most common formulation in post-World War II na-
tional and international documents, protects rights of both "religion"
and "conscience."16 At first glance, this suggests a broader, if not a
stronger, application of the right, under the Canadian formulation. In
addition, the broader formulation eliminates the need, not uncom-
mon in First Amendment cases, to determine when a belief system
qualifies for protection as a religion.
In practice, however, there may be less significance to this
distinction than might appear likely. In cases interpreting the scope
of the statutory exemption of religiously-based conscientious objec-
tors from the military draft during the Vietnam War era, the Su-
164 See generally Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious
Exercise:An Amazing Post-Smith jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REv. 275 (1993).
165 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
166 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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preme Court broadened the scope of the concept of religion far be-
yond traditional boundaries.'6 ' A "sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying"1 68 as religious would
suffice. Clearly, the line between the religious and the conscientious
was, if not eliminated, certainly blurred. Of interest for our purposes
of examining the relationship between freedom of religion and non-
establishment principles, Justice Harlan concurred in these decisions
despite skepticism on legislative intent, on the grounds that limiting
the definition to traditional forms of religion would pose a serious
Establishment Clause problem.169
Although the draft exemption cases were matters of statuto-
ry interpretation, 1e courts in subsequent years applied similarly
broad notions of religion in a wide range of cases seeking free exer-
cise exemptions. While the Supreme. Court has noted that purely
"personal reasons" might not qualify, and also allowed courts to ex-
amine the sincerity of the claimant's belief, in the absence of evi-
dence of insincerity, or a belief system so outlandish as to suggest
that the claimant is merely seeking personal gain, courts have been
hesitant to reject claims of religious belief.17 1 Although Canadian
courts do not seem to have dealt with the scope of "conscience," it
would not be surprising if that concept were also subject to some
limits, such as sincerity. The Charter language more clearly protects
agnostic or atheistic belief systems, but it would seem that in prac-
tice the absence of a reference to conscience in the First Amendment
does not lead to a significant difference in the breadth of the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the religious freedom provi-
sion of the Canadian Charter.
167 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2(a).
168 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970).
1 69 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
170 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171 See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding transcendental
meditation as religion); Petersen v. Wilmer Commcn's, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d
1014 (2002) (finding "Creativity," a philosophy of white supremacy, as reli-
gion); Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994) (finding Sa-
tanism as religion).
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Justice Harlan's insight that a narrow definition of religion in
the draft exemption cases would raise serious Establishment Clause
questions points to one way in which the Establishment Clause
serves to limit government not in merely abstract ways, but in ser-
vice of freedom of conscience. How does a government practice that
does not coerce an individual (in Justice Scalia's narrow definition of
coercion)17 2 create a concrete, individualized injury sufficient to
grant standing to those objecting to the program? The Supreme
Court addressed this question in Flast v. Cohen,173 holding that the
Establishment Clause created a right to be free of government ac-
tions rising to the level of establishment.174 The Court recognized
that denial of standing would essentially immunize, from challenge
government financial aid to religion, the most classic type of estab-
lishment activity.17 5 In doing so, the Court brought within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment religious dissenters, not merely those of
different faiths, but also the nonreligious. Although subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions have chipped away at the holding of Flast,17 6 it
remains as a reminder that the religion clauses are meant to do more
than assure qual treatment of traditional religions.
The recognition that the Establishment Clause does not
merely limit government in pursuit of some abstract principles, but
rather in the service of individual rights, can go a long way to explain
the presence of a non-establishment principle in a constitutional sys-
tem without an express establishment clause, particularly one which,
like Canada's, respects freedom of conscience as well as religion. At
the same time, when Canadian courts decide cases presenting what
172 The most prominent of the cases in which courts refuse to recognize individ-
ual beliefs are those in which is seems clear that the religious claim was meant
to protect illegal drug use. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th
Cir. 1996); State v. Pederson, 679 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
173 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
174 Id. at 103-04 ("The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly
that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could em-
ploy its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another and to aid
religion in general.").
175s Id.
176 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (finding no taxpayer standing to challenge
the transfer of government property to a religious college).
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United States courts would recognize as Establishment Clause cases
as religious freedom cases, and deciding them in Ways that are no
less protective of non-establishment values (and, in the case of local
legislative prayer, more protective), it should suggest that recent Es-
tablishment Clause claims in the United States Supreme Court have
leaned too far in the direction of accommodation.
The existence of two separate religion clauses in the First
Amendment may serve to mask the degree in which they are each
grounded in the protection of individual conscience. Standing alone,
the Establishment Clause can seem to be a restraint on government,
but one disconnected from any individual right. Only when a severe
instance of coercion is challenged will the function of the Clause in
protecting individual rights be recognized.
Canadian decisions, starting with Big M and including City of
Saguenay, serve to highlight the connection between religious free-
dom and non-establishment principles.177 By itself, the principle of
free exercise prohibits state coercion in matters of religion, and as a
corollary, insists on non-discrimination based on religion. The pres-
ence of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, then,
should be seen as serving to emphasize the connection between non-
establishment values and individual religious freedom, rather than
the introduction of a separate principle that stands in tension with
the Free Exercise Clause.
At the very least, the contrast between City of Saguenay and
Town of Greece should suggest hat non-establishment values are be-
ing under-enforced by the United States Supreme Court. To interpret
the Establishment Clause as requiring only neutrality among reli-
gions ignores the growing number of Americans who do not regard
themselves as belonging to a particular denomination, including but
not limited to atheists and agnostics.17 8 To see no Establishment
Clause problem in the absence of government coercion, in the nar-
row definition put forward by Justice Scalia, ignores the significance
of government endorsement of religion. The United States Supreme
Court is unlikely to begin citing foreign decisions to any significant
177 See R v. Big M Drug Mart; [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301-02; Mouvement Laique
Qubb6cois v. City of Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 5 (Can.).
178 See supra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
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extent in the near future. But where a constitutional system that, in
the absence of an express Establishment Clause leads to court deci-
sions that seem more deferential to non-establishment values than
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it certainly pro-
vides food for thought. 9 Is it possible, however paradoxical, that a
separate Establishment Clause, by disguising the connection be-
tween non-establishment principles and free exercise rights, might
lead to less respect for non-establishment principles than would be
the case if the clause were not there?
17 See America's Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 12,
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-
landscape/. The survey finds 22.8% of America's "unaffiliated" with any partic-
ular religion. Interestingly, Pew finds a similar trend in Canada, Canada's Chang-
ing Religious Landscape, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (une 27, 2013),
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/27/canadas-changing-religious-
landscape/.
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